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Abstract 
This article broadly engages with international law and human rights protection. Its focus is 
on jus cogens, but it also considers universal jurisdiction and erga omnes. In its examination 
of jus cogens, this article analyses its history, trajectory and philosophical underpinnings. 
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Introduction 
Few and far between are the areas of law which have the capacity to invoke lively discussion 
in audiences of all colours. Whilst it may be onerous to find a non-lawyer debating fungible 
and non fungible assets à la Hunter v Moss2, the area which this article seeks to engage is 
one which inspires such debate. It goes to the heart of the law and also overtly trespasses 
into the realms of politics, morality and ethics. Christopher Hitchens might have been the 
most eloquent non-legal commentator when he stated that: 
 The next phase or epoch is already discernible; it is the fight to extend the concept of 
 universal human rights, and to match the ‘globalisation’ of production by the 
 globalisation of a common standard for justice and ethics'3 
 
Hitchens is referring to international law, which is framed by the principles of jus cogens, 
erga omnes and universal jurisdiction. While this paper will focus on jus cogens, we should 
keep in mind that these three principles are intertwined to an extent. Erga omnes obligations 
and jus cogens have been described both as forming part of 'core guarantees'4 within human 
rights law; whilst universal jurisdiction could be surmised as a concept which allows 
transgressions against these principles to be prosecuted regardless of geographical 
limitations. Taken together, they solidify the notion that 'individuals have international duties 
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the respective State.'5  
 
                                                          
1
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earlier drafts and recommended some excellent books for clarification of this article. Stefano has just 
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This paper will explore these concepts incorporating a historical perspective and some of 
their formative ideas. As such, it is divided into several sections. Part I considers an 
overview of jus cogens, erga omnes and universal jurisdiction and attempts to provide some 
context. Part II examines natural law and the connection between it and jus cogens. Part III 
analyses legal positivism and its alternate claim to the formation of jus cogens. Part IV 
examines the influence of the Nuremberg trials on these phenomena. Part VI considers 
recent expansion of jus cogens and universal jurisdiction, commenting on the perceived 
advantages and disadvantages. Finally, part VII concludes and attempts to offer a 
contextualised prognosis for the shelf life of jus cogens, erga omnes and universal 
jurisdiction. 
 
1 Setting the Stage 
While not defining jus cogens itself, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does 
specify the effect of a jus cogens norm on a treaty. Jus cogens norms void treaties if they 
conflict, 6  including retroactive invalidation. 7  Jus cogens norms also possess a slightly 
amplified scope and according to Bantekas and Oette impose a more broad 'duty not to 
recognise (or contribute to the perpetuation of) situations resulting from violations of jus 
cogens norms and to take measures to bring such situations to an end'.8 Furthermore, jus 
cogens binds the Security Council, with Judge Lauterpacht considering it 'as a matter of 
simple hierarchy of norms'9, with jus cogens outranking a Security Council resolution.  
  
On the subject of universal jurisdiction, it allows for an offence to be tried in any country in 
the world, as the crime is deemed to be so egregious as to be one against humanity. An 
example of its operation would be that of the arrest (in London) of a Nepalese torturer.10 The 
man in question was not held accountable in Nepal due to a lack of will to prosecute his 
alleged crimes, however, due to the status of torture as a crime with universal jurisdiction, 
the UK (or any other country) is able to prosecute him regardless of the geographical 
location of his alleged offence.  
 
                                                          
6
 Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
7
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Considering erga omnes, it is simply an obligation all States hold toward all other States. In 
Furundzija,11 erga omnes obligations were described as 'obligations owed towards all the 
other members of the international community, each of which then has a correlative right.'12 
This right can be invoked if an erga omnes obligation is violated, which then allows for any 
member to 'insist on fulfilment of the obligation or in any case to call for the breach to be 
discontinued.'13  
 
These doctrines apply to the protection of human rights. We are now at a stage in history in 
which human rights have huge cultural capital. Hopgood even argues that perhaps the best 
hope for international human rights is for them to be consumed as part of 'aspirational 
Western norms.'14 Nonetheless, the capital is potent - the most populous country in the world, 
China, has gone from one in which human rights were 'dismissed outright as bourgeois'15 to 
one which has to claim to adhere to these values. Even a State like North Korea, which is 
almost universally regarded as having an atrocious record with human rights, has to pretend 
to uphold them (recently defending its human rights record at the UN16).  
 
The legal constructs of jus cogens, erga omnes and universal jurisdiction could be seen as 
an attempt to unify a State's words and actions in certain areas of human rights law, and as 
such have attracted much attention. In recent years the whole edifice supporting jus cogens 
has been described in quasi-religious terms as a 'secular monotheism'17 for a decaying 
Europe to cling to in a brave new world. Or, conversely as part of the integral framework 
which constitutes the 'law of humanity'18 or even as a new 'jus gentium'19. Strong conviction 
is the easy bedfellow of change, and as such, it is to be expected that the twenty-first 
century will bring much transformation to the aforementioned doctrines. We entered this 
century holding a set of tools which attempted to embody the idea that there are some 
values which cannot be infringed, and which place a collective burden on all to uphold them. 
                                                          
11
 Prosecutor v Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment (International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, 10th December 1998). 
12




 S. Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights, (2013, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
Kindle version), ch.VIII, s.III, at para.IV. 
15
 M. Svensson, Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History, (2002, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,), p.315. 
16
 'North Korea defends human rights record in report to UN', BBC News Website, 8 October 2014, 
accessed at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29531969 10 October 2014. 
17
 Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights at para.VI. 
18
 R. Tietel, Humanity's Law (2011, New York: Oxford University Press) p.4. 
19
 Trindade, Augosto, 'Jus Cogens The determination and the gradual expansion of its material 
content in contemporary international case-law', in XXXV Curso de Derecho Internacional Organizado 
por el Comité Jurídico Interamericano – OAS (2008), 3-29, at p.5. 
Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2015) 1 
50 
 
In order to grapple with the offered potential for legal globalisation, it is imperative to 
examine jus cogens as a tool for its realisation as well as its underlying ideas. 
 
2 Natural Origins 
The origins of jus cogens are difficult to clearly pin down. According to Bianchi, 'Before its 
sanctioning by judicial decisions in the 1990s, jus cogens had been largely developed by 
international legal scholarship.'20 At its roots jus cogens also draws upon elements of natural 
law and the two do share some overt similarities, notably as being ostensibly 'moral' 
doctrines and wielding a large amount of power. These considerations, also impact upon 
erga omnes and universal jurisdiction as they too, draw from 'moral' elements and possess 
much potency, seemingly sharing a similar genealogy.  
 
It must be kept in mind that 'Natural law theory is a broad tradition,'21 and there are a 
pantheon of views from which to take. However, its adherents often try to ground claims in 
objectivity, as such, 'moral realism is an important component of this tradition.'22 Objectivity 
in a moral sense then leads to an ability to create an objectively correct law. This objectivity 
plateau can be reached by following a number of routes which Bix identifies, namely: human 
reason, human nature, or being expressed in nature.23  
 
The human reason argument is often based upon the idea that there are some things, 
discoverable by use of reason, which are self-evidently desirable, and acting or legislating 
contrary to these would be undesirable. For Finnis, they are things that 'any sane person is 
capable of seeing' and are akin to 'mathematical principles' in the sense that they would be 
true even if they were not understood.24 For him at least, this would include things like 
friendship or knowledge. In recent years, the neuroscientist Dr. Harris has argued that the 
highest point of well-being for everyone would be moral goodness in and of itself, and the 
most possible suffering would be immoral in parallel. Adding that 'it seems like the only 
legitimate context in which to conceive of values and moral norms.'25 
 
                                                          
20
 A. Bianchi, 'Human Rights and The Magic of Jus Cogens', (2008), European Journal of International 
Law, 19(3), 491-508, at 493. 
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 B. Bix, 'On the dividing line between natural law theory and legal positivism', (2000), Notre Dame 
Law Review, 75(5), 1613-1624, at 1613. 
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 Ibid, at 1617. 
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 B. Bix., Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (2012, London: Sweet and Maxwell, Kindle version) 
ch.V, s.II, at para.VI 
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 J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2011: New York, Oxford University Press, 2
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 edn) at 
pp.30, 24. 
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Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice Review (2015) 1 
51 
 
The human nature argument has been described as one relating to our '“essence” or 
“purpose”'26. As such, natural law is dependent upon the nature of man. This can be seen as 
far back as Cicero's De Legibus: 'we shall have to explain the true nature of moral justice, 
which is congenial and correspondent with the true nature of man.'27 The other route is that 
of being expressed in nature, which would include divine mandate. This is a long-lived 
branch of natural law which at least stretches over two millennia. To illustrate, scholars have 
analysed Sophocles' 5th century tragedy Antigone as a tension between 'legitimate 
commands... and the obligation to the laws of Heaven'28. For some thinkers who ascribe to 
the divine mandate theory, such natural law could permit of change by a god (as in Aquinas' 
Summa Theologica - 'whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, 
whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural'29). Or alternatively, as for Grotius, it could 
be 'so unalterable, that it cannot be changed even by God himself.'30 Perhaps, one such 
dividing line could well be the question of to whom, or what, is owed highest allegiance - only 
Aquinas' train of thought allowing for a God to justly command what would otherwise be 
against natural law.   
 
For natural law theorists, arriving at such objectivity, natural law would bind all, regardless of 
consent. A good summation would be the US Declaration of Independence which speaks of 
men being 'endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,'31 these are the calibre 
of rights that would supersede sovereignty. Here in part, can be glimpsed a pitfall of the 
natural law argument; the argument is rooted in belief in one of its bases. Thus, it is then 
subject to the interpreter's belief in it, rendering it 'nonsense upon stilts'32for some, or to be 
regarded as 'emotive language concealed in assertive forms'.33 As an example, someone 
who chose a position of non-belief in a law of nature (e.g. gravity) is likely to face very real, 
immediate problems acting upon this. However, the consequences for disobeying natural 
law are not in the same vein, as any consequences for breaking law are manmade and do 
not have to necessarily exist, although they may be desirable. Societies have functioned for 
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long periods of time without following them - a good example here would be the Assyrian 
empire, which routinely acted contrary to what is often accepted to be natural law principles34 
and yet lasted for around 1,700 years.35 Jus Cogens, erga omnes and universal jurisdiction 
provide some level of practical ramifications to actions which violate these norms. In fact, jus 
cogens concerns itself with abuses which are also high moral outrages (and would likely 
violate natural law at its basest level) such as 'aggression, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery and slave-related practices, and torture.'36  
 
3 Positivism's Challenge 
Those who would ascribe to the stilts line of thinking may well be legal positivists. Legal 
positivism generally holds that 'a descriptive, or at least morally neutral, theory of law is both 
possible and valuable'. 37  Consequently, many believe that it is 'fundamentally 
irreconcilable'38 with natural law. Using this doctrine, jus cogens evolves from State assent, 
thereby retaining sovereignty. When jus cogens was being laid out in the Vienna Convention, 
the expert consultant for the delegates Sir Humphrey Waldcock 'explained that the 
International Law Commission had based its approach to the question of jus cogens on 
positive law much more than on natural law39'. Sir Waldock's approach would be necessary 
in the international arena, as States may well be concerned about any opening of floodgates 
to being bound without their consent, especially as Westphalian sovereignty has been a 
guiding principle for so long. Furthermore, the international arena requires cooperation and 
simply being told that 'X is now the law' is unlikely to facilitate progress. Unfortunately, a 
debilitating critique of positivism as an explanation is that there is no pinpoint location for the 
birth of jus cogens.40  
 
Unfortunately for legal positivism, by the time jus cogens was being expressed the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties was largely accepted as existing, casting doubt on 
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As an example, the cruel way they treated rebelling cities - 'Many within the border of my own land I 
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35
 D. Carlin, Judgment at Nivineh, Hardcore History (Audio Podcast, 14/12/2009), retrieved from 
http://www.dancarlin.com/product/hardcore-history-17-judgment-at-nineveh/ 
36
 Bassiouni, M, Cherif, 'International crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes', (1996) Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 59(4) 63-74, at 68. 
37
  Bix. Jurisprudence: Theory and Context, ch.III, s.I, at para.I. 
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positivism as it had seemingly been summoned without going through any real legislative 
channels. Indeed the Argentinean delegate stated that 'to recognize the existence of 
international norms of jus cogens was merely to acknowledge reality.'41 In the twenty-first 
century, uncertainty still dogs jus cogens, for example, it remains uncertain as to when a 
norm will gain the status of jus cogens. In fact, it is so unclear as to precisely when a 
provision will become jus cogens, that it has been stated that 'it appears that judges and 
scholars simply consult their own consciences' 42 in finding a jus cogens norm. If anything, 
this summation helps tie jus cogens more solidly into natural law theory by making the moral 
heritage of jus cogens highly explicit. 
 
Paradoxically, what can really be gleaned from the drafting of the Convention is the 
confusion that surrounds the origins of jus cogens. Whilst some delegates highlight the 
similarities of jus cogens and natural law, i.e. by using them almost interchangeably  
(Monaco's delegate 43 ) or stating that they were 'in a sense comparable' 44 . It was 
acknowledged that: 'the various schools of thought did not agree on the origin of those 
norms; some held that it lay in natural law, others that it came from the will of States as 
expressed in treaties or in custom.'45 In the sense that jus cogens exists and yet it is so 
uncertain as to how it came into being, it seems that it had attained a kind of emperor's new 
clothes quality. 
 
4 The Nuremberg Fallout 
It was not certain that there would necessarily be a trial following an Allied victory as 
elements within the Allied administrations were pushing for summary executions of high 
ranking Nazis. It has since emerged how close history was to not having the Nuremberg 
trials, since there was a time when: 'Henry Morgenthau Jnr, a close personal friend and 
adviser to Roosevelt, had even managed to persuade the President and Winston Churchill to 
sign an agreement to execute captured Nazi leaders.'46 For a number of reasons, this did not 
come to fruition and the Nuremberg trials became a huge milestone in the expansion of a 
universal, or higher law. It was recognised by the justices that they had convened to try 
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 United Nations Conventions on the Law of Treaties, 54th meeting of the committee as a whole, at 
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crimes which 'have no particular geographical location'.47 In the course of this duty there 
were many blows to the idea of legal positivism. Justice Jackson expounded that the crux 
would not concern 'mere technical or incidental transgression of international conventions,'48 
but rather would be grounded in 'guilt on planned and intended conduct that involves moral 
as well as legal wrong.49  
 
Clearly, this heralded an era in which an offence could exist independent of a clear statute or 
State consent with which to contextualise it, but rather that the crimes tried had 'often been 
interpreted to go beyond conventional or consent-based foundations in international law, and 
arguably represent an expansion of jus cogens'.50 However, it seemed that jurisdiction for 
the Nuremberg trials was not entirely universal. One dissenting judge, Radhabinod Pal had 
decried 'the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States as the worst 
atrocities of the war, comparable with Nazi crimes.'51 This has been furthered by Chomsky 
who opined that if the principles of the Nuremberg trials were universal then 'every post-war 
American president would have been hanged.'52 It is here that we can see the intertwining of 
politics and law that posed, and will pose great challenges for the doctrine. Moving forward, 
the degree to which a Head of State can be liable to jus cogens is still not entirely clear. 
Whilst Pinochet53 clearly shows that Heads of State are not entirely immune to jus cogens, 
Al-Adsani v UK54 shows that State Immunity overcomes jus cogens on civil claims. While jus 
cogens has is a potent doctrine which can supersede much international law, it 'should not 
be seen as a trump card that can be played against all other international legal obligations.'55 
 
5 Doctrinal Challenges 
Perhaps the most glaring problem for advocates of jus cogens is that no one knows exactly 
when a norm will become a jus cogens one. In fact, the view that jus cogens exists is not 
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universal, but rather is 'overwhelming' 56  and is a doctrine which not all, but 'most 
international lawyers recognize'. 57  The Vienna Convention states that in terms of the 
Convention, jus cogens is a ‘norm of general international law … accepted and recognized 
by the international community of States as a whole.’58 Here lies a core problem with the 
doctrine since it was recognised in the Convention, namely that of deciding when a norm 
would gain the status of jus cogens. This was discussed at the time, the Irish delegate stated 
that it is 'essential to establish independent machinery for adjudicating on alleged violations 
of jus cogens.'59 Currently, the only real machinery that adjudicates on jus cogens would be 
judges and the International Criminal Court of Justice.        
 
For many the idea of jus cogens along with international human rights standards seems to 
embody European values which poses a secondary problem. Perhaps these are values that 
are being foisted on other States without their consent - a sort of legal imperialism. In their 
auspiciously titled Eastphalia Rising, Fidler and Ganguly note the rise of the BRIC countries 
who would guard their sovereignty against this kind of infringement. The twenty-first century 
presents a power shift and 'past western sermonizing about how other countries should 
follow the Western models now seems quaint'60. This idea seems to create a level of friction 
which is not just one way between States. A notable example would be that some 
commentators have suggested that the joint Russia and China veto of military action in Syria 
is an example of a breach of a jus cogens to prevent war crimes.61 From this vantage point, 
a worry is that jus cogens could be marching into a BRIC wall and the dynamics of 
international law could change. According to Hopgood: 
 The BRICS are not necessarily against international law as such, but this regime with 
 rules they did not write will be more about sovereignty as prerogative than as 
 responsibility. In such a system reciprocity will reassume its historical importance as 
 the key mechanism for making norms effective.62  
 
In light of this, perhaps one symptom of such a decline could be the recognition of regional 
jus cogens, in which a norm can paradoxically enjoy jus cogens status in one region and not 
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in another. Hasmath asserts this in relation to sentencing juvenile offenders to the death 
penalty. It was held to violate a regional jus cogens norm in the Americas in 1987 but was 
not recognised in full by the UN in 2002:  
 In other words, this norm was not universally fixed within the international legal 
 system, but was slowly gathering momentum. In the interim, it effectively enjoyed the 
 status of a regional jus cogens norm in OAS member states63 (OAS - Organization of  
 American States).  
 
Whilst the author of that article concludes regional jus cogens could be useful in facilitating 
an expansion of jus cogens norms in different regions this is seemingly problematic. In 
particular, if jus cogens does stem from natural law and is formed by moral values, the idea 
of regional jus cogens could be the start of a slippery slope by which jus cogens becomes 
relative and moves away from this basis. Consequently, a State could argue a jus cogens 
rule does not apply on the basis that it is regional jus cogens and does not extend its cover 
to the particular State. 
 
For at least some of the delegates to the Vienna Convention, the idea of regional jus cogens 
would be missing the point of jus cogens and it seems that it is organically evolving away 
from much of their intent. One delegate stated that 'The moral and spiritual values inherent 
in jus cogens could only assert themselves with the desired peremptory force if no 
geographical limits were placed on their applicability.'64 
 
The inherent problem that the doctrine is faced with is that it is (to paraphrase Bentham) 
something of a ‘giant on stilts’. It possesses huge power, but at the same time, very shaky 
foundations. By allowing for regional jus cogens, jus cogens as a whole loses a level of 
philosophical underpinning and appeal. Part of the attraction of jus cogens is that it is 
universal, this is also a core characteristic of the doctrine. Violations then shift from the more 
natural law influenced affronts to humanity, to an affront to particular humans in a particular 
time and space. The natural law foundations are picked away at (even if regional jus cogens 
has positive pragmatic connotations in terms of acceptance) leaving the whole edifice 
precariously balanced more than ever. 
 
This edifice also has a large limitation as it was one which was codified primarily in order to 
void treaty law. It has been observed that States almost never conclude treaties with 
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'obligations to torture, commit genocide, institutionalize slavery or apartheid.' 65  These 
functions are performed outside of the scope of treaties. Furthermore, when domestic law or 
executive power runs contrary to a jus cogens principle the State may attempt to define the 
problem away. A notable example would be the issue of waterboarding in the United States 
and the attempt of Yoo and Bybee to place it outside of the scope of torture.66 It is with this in 
mind, that the natural law principles behind jus cogens work best in tandem with erga omnes 
and universal jurisdiction, as together they provide a more effective cover. On its own, jus 
cogens is just one tool in the box in enforcing a form of natural law. 
 
There is also one last final consideration that we could take on board: what would happen if 
a jus cogens norm conflicted with another jus cogens norm? For scholars like Kleien, this 
could be a future problem in attempting to place jus cogens at the top of a hierarchy as it 
may become 'impossible to solve a conflict between competing rights in a convincing 
manner'67. In globalising human rights standards this conflict seems inevitable, and any way 
around it seemingly weakens the doctrine itself. One jus cogens right would presumably 
have to beat the other, in which case would this mean that a hierarchy needs to be re-
established? Interestingly, this problem is also one faced by natural law theorists with one 
conclusion being that adjudicating on which should supersede which would be akin to 
'comparing one object’s weight with another’s length'68. Even if this problem is navigated, the 
language of absolute, non-derogable human rights in this area does not lend itself well to 
doing so and it would seemingly weaken the doctrine. 
 
6 Expansion and Growing Pains  
Jus cogens has emerged as a doctrine that, by its nature, expands according to the zeitgeist 
of the international community. As an example of what could be considered reaching a new 
high-water mark in terms of jus cogens cover, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
affirmed that workplace rights exist as a jus cogens for everyone once an employment 
relationship is established - disregarding workers' migratory status. This means that in terms 
of the workplace, 'the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination has entered 
the realm of jus cogens.'69 In the same case Justice Trindade stated that: 
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 jus cogens, in my understanding, is an open category, which expands itself to the 
 extent that the universal juridical conscience (material source of all Law) awakens for 
 the necessity to protect the rights inherent to each human being in every and any 
 situation.70  
 
It is here that we can see both the power, and weakness of the doctrine. The fact that 
Justice Trindade expresses the scope of jus cogens in terms of how awake the universal 
juridical conscience is shows that it is a theory that has potential for greatly expanding the 
application of human rights. On the other hand, to its detractors, this kind of expansion 
unfairly serves the interest of the judiciary at the expense of democratically elected 
Government. Arguably, jus cogens and its power to supersede State sovereignty were 
intended for the grossest of human rights abuses in order to mark them out. Is employment 
law as pertaining to undocumented migrants such an abuse worthy of bypassing the 
democratic process in the country in question? The US Supreme Court Judge Hon. Antonin 
Scalia stated that judges deciding questions of public policy through case law seemed 'anti-
democratic'71. Indeed, especially regarding questions of ethics and morality, he has argued 
that 'These aren't a lawyer's questions'72. 
  
As an illustrative example of what might not be considered 'a lawyer's question', recent case 
law has shown the doctrine of jus cogens evolve and perhaps overreach itself. The case of 
Soering73 held that the United Kingdom could not extradite to a country where those being 
extradited would experience the 'death row phenomenon' as to do so would breach the 
torture law which has jus cogens status. The death row phenomenon has been described as 
'prolonged incarceration on death row'74 and the accompanying mental distress. If this were 
to continue to evolve, then perhaps it could infringe upon a country’s domestic affairs. Whilst 
arguably, in this example, use of the ballot box could constitute a form of ostrakophoria,75 the 
fundamental questions of where legal power lies have to be answered if unelected judges try 
to prevent a death sentence being carried out in the US on jus cogens grounds. These 
questions have been posited for some time, and reappear in relation to jus cogens and its 
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interplay with universal jurisdiction. According to Kissinger, 'Universal jurisdiction risks 
creating universal tyranny – that of judges.'76 Whilst Kissinger makes good points, including 
the idea that it unfairly asks the defendant to bring witnesses/evidence a very long distance, 
it should be noted that his particular criticisms could be arguably resulting from the negative 
exposure he had personally received while serving as US Secretary of State during times of 
controversial US involvement with tense international political developments .77  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, jus cogens is a unique tool with an uncertain past and future. It has been at the 
forefront of many of the most fundamental debates surrounding the will of the State and 
human rights issues. Indeed, to think of human rights and jus cogens together has been 
described as a 'natural intellectual reflex'.78 Whilst its roots have been said to stretch to 
natural law or even Stoicism, the doctrine itself was seemingly conjured out of nowhere, 
leading one commentator to suggest that its future is in the hands of 'The magicians.'79 It has 
seen rapid expansion and whilst there have been examples of jus cogens being trumped 
recently, it is important to note that these are not uncontroversial. In Adsani, for instance, the 
ECtHR held by only 9 to 8 (a borderline majority) that jus cogens did not overcome State 
immunity from civil claims. As such, this author thinks that the expansion of jus cogens has 
not been halted per se, but certainly remains a contentious issue. The coming century's 
battles for jus cogens will likely be close, and not without difficulty, however, confidence in its 
continued expansion is not unwarranted. 
 
What can perhaps be gleaned the most is that whilst there are several big challenges 
awaiting the doctrine, the ideas behind jus cogens (and also erga omnes/ universal 
jurisdiction) are very persistent. In fact, the values driving these doctrines (in this author's 
view they stem from the value of a person) are human values. The idea that there have 
always been 'rules of the game' and that the State does not possess absolute power has 
seemingly cropped up organically in a multitude of contexts. As contemporary political 
commentator Dan Carlin has contested, observing a historically consistent pattern of 
massive legal restructuring during post-war periods with a view for peace/higher ethical 
standards.80 . Jus Cogens has certainly benefited from this process. As such, were jus 
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cogens eventually to lose some of its potency to a more multi-polar or democratic world, we 
may confidently expect it to re-appear in another guise, as it is a symptom of our collective 
moral leaning. It fits the idea that there must be something to temper the black letter of the 
law, by way of analogy, pruning one branch would not kill the tree. To conclude, as Martin 
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